Are Psychological Quantities and Measurement Relevant in the 21st Century? by McGrane, Joshua A.
www.frontiersin.org  July 2010  | Volume 1  | Article 22  |  1
Frontiers Commentary
published: 07 July 2010
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2010.00022
Are psychological quantities and measurement relevant in the 
21st century?
Joshua A. McGrane*
Pearson Psychometric Laboratory, Graduate School of Education, University of Western Australia, Perth, WA, Australia
*Correspondence: joshua.mcgrane@uwa.edu.au
A commentary on
Challenges for quantitative psychology and 
measurement in the 21st century
by Jason W. Osborne Front. Psychol. (2010), 
1:1.
Osborne (2010, p. 1) argues that as quantita-
tive psychologists we must “keep challenging 
ourselves…and…continue questioning and 
examining our tacit assumptions”. Whilst I 
wholeheartedly endorse the critical and opti-
mistic spirit of his article, I find it alarming 
that he only implicitly directs quantitative 
psychologists to question and examine their 
most fundamental tacit assumption. This 
is the claim, or rather, inadequately tested 
hypothesis that continuous, psychological 
quantities exist. Unless we “shrug off the 
shackles of 20th century methodology and 
thinking” (Osborne, 2010, p. 3) and seri-
ously address this hypothesis, the relevance 
of quantitative psychology, and the “meas-
urements” it provides will remain obscure 
in this century and beyond.
The desire to replicate the physical sci-
ences model in psychology has a long his-
tory, as do criticisms of this desire, which I 
cannot do justice in the present commen-
tary (see Michell, 1999). The culmination of 
this history took place when Stevens (1946)
proposed a new definition of measurement, 
as numerical application according to rule, 
which would have a profound effect upon 
the  practice  of  Psychology,  including  the 
“explosive  progress”  that  Osborne  (2010, 
p. 2) refers to. But, at what cost has this 
“progress”  come?  The  fact  that  Stevens’ 
definition endures in the mainstream even 
today is testament to the schism between 
quantitative  psychology  and  quantitative 
science more generally.
There is only one rule for measurement in 
quantitative science. This is, the estimation 
of a magnitude of a quantity by its ratio to 
a unit of the same quantity (Michell, 1999). 
This is not a trivial matter, as even Stevens 
(1946) acknowledged that everything from 
the calculation of the humble mean and 
t-test through to the sophisticated multivari-
ate analyses that Osborne (2010) refers to 
are contingent upon this “kind of” measure-
ment1. Thus, even though our data may be 
“hard-earned” (p. 3), if they are not derived 
from  defensible  measurement  practices, 
then our toil simply leads to questionable 
inferences and continued scepticism from 
outside the discipline (Cliff, 1996).
Thankfully,  a  number  of  quantita-
tive psychologists have eschewed Stevens’ 
definition and proposed ways to measure 
psychological attributes in a manner that is 
consistent with the physical sciences (Luce 
and  Tukey,  1964;  Rasch,  1980;  Michell, 
1990). Axiomatic Conjoint Measurement 
theory and the class of Rasch models stand 
out from the crowd as potential tools to be 
used by psychologists to test their quan-
titative  assumptions,  establish  standard 
units  of  measurement,  and  bring  about 
defensible  methodological  practices  (see 
Humphry  and  Andrich,  2008;  Kyngdon, 
2008). However, the minimal impact that 
these approaches have had on mainstream 
psychology over the past half-century does 
raise the question of whether they are suf-
ficient or even necessary for addressing the 
question of psychological quantities.
A more fundamental cognitive shift seems 
to be required whereby the application of 
such mathematical models is not seen as an 
end unto itself, as measurement never takes 
place  in  a  theoretical  vacuum.  One  only 
needs to take a cursory look at measurement 
practices in the physical sciences to realize 
that they are intrinsically linked to what has 
been described as a “body of workable, quan-
titative theories and laws” (Michell, 1999, p. 
217). This means a body of substantive, quan-
titative theories and laws and not algebraic 
ideals. Thus, before we may defensibly apply 
such models, the burden is upon us as quan-
titative psychologists to delve into the applied 
literature  to  establish  and  experimentally 
investigate strong, quantitative psychologi-
cal theories (Borsboom, 2006).
Michell (2009) and Trendler (2009) pro-
vide  examples  of  the  necessary  theoretical 
analysis and their conclusions are alarming. 
Firstly, Michell argues that many psychologi-
cal attributes are necessarily not quantitative, 
as unlike established physical quantities, the 
differences between levels of these attributes 
are not mutually homogeneous. Furthermore, 
Trendler argues that quantification and meas-
urement will never be possible in psychology, as 
we will never possess the necessary control over 
our subject matter. Whilst their arguments are 
compelling, it is pertinent to note that the sys-
tems of measurement in the physical sciences 
were developed over centuries and necessarily 
required a large amount of qualitative work to 
substantiate them (Kuhn, 1961). Thus, it seems 
premature to conclude that quantification and 
measurement are, in principle, not possible in 
psychology. However, this possibility can only 
be realized (or not) if we stop begging the quan-
tity and measurement questions.
So  I  accept  Osborne’s  (2010)  chal-
lenges and I add my own (on behalf of 
the authors cited from whom this com-
mentary is derived). If it is to be shown 
that  Quantitative  Psychology  is  relevant 
to the 21st century and beyond, then we 
must provide empirical evidence for the 
existence of psychological quantities and 
then establish units by which they can be 
measured. Hopefully, given Osborne’s edi-
torial directive, some of the pages of this 
new and exciting journal will be dedicated 
to this most fundamental challenge.
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